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For most, Galicia in the Civil War is restricted merely to the role of its troops in the Nationalist rank and file and its supplies to feed that army. Forgotten are the anarchosyndicalist movements of Coruña and Vigo, the liberal tendencies of its bourgeoisie and its nationalist dimension, most visibly expressed in its plebiscite to approve its own statute in June 1936. These currents of opinion did not disappear overnight in July 1936.

This paper will examine and focus on the Civil War in Galicia, highlighting the forgotten voices of those left in the Francoist/Nationalist rearguard, fighting and resisting the regime from within, a group overlooked in subsequent histories. It will draw on research conducted with interviews with members of the guerrilla movement in Ferrol, those involved in attempted coups within barracks at Coruña in November 1936 and mutinies on board the cruiser Baleares, as well as the ordinary Galicians who were opposed to the insurrection. In so doing it will reassess contemporary views of the Spanish Civil War, through oral and written testimonies, and touch on the issues of regional nationalism and violence, from a Galician perspective. 

From both the perspective of the victor (vencedor) and the vanquished (vencido), Nationalist and Republican, the topic of Galicia in the Civil War is limited. The former would argue that nothing much of note took place in the region after the end of July 1936, the latter that no real resistance took place there, and that what the region witnessed after July 1936 was a form of continual repression rather than effective resistance (Heine, 1982: 16).

The principal aim of this essay is to highlight aspects of the resistance that existed in the region to the military rebellion of July 1936 by examining two immediate post uprising rebellions in the main military and naval headquarters there, at Coruña and Ferrol. If successful, these would arguably have changed the development of the war in Spain as a whole. This spirit of resistance went on to form the nucleus of the fuxidos/huidos, the basis of the future guerrilla movement in the region after 1939. The essay will focus on the emergence of the guerrilla group that operated around Ferrol and northern Lugo. It is hoped that by so doing, the image of Galicia during the Civil War and post war years may change from that of simply passive victim or willing participant in the new regime.


1. Unrest in the Region 1936
Galicia formed the rearguard of soon to be Nationalist Spain, but resistance to the new military regime, illustrated by the number of courts martial and executions, did not just peter out at the end of July, as some publications on this period imply. Nor, just as importantly, did the Galicia guerrilla movement spring up from nowhere after the end of the fratricide in 1939. In the intervening war years resistance to the new military regime, though disparate, was already in evidence.

Contemporary reports, when viewed for the region as a whole and not as isolated incidents, undermine the military censor’s portrayal of a pacified civilian populace. The finding of explosives and firearms in Vigo or Coruña, the discovery of illegal printers producing anti-military propaganda, or anti-rebel radio broadcasts and fugitive (huido) subscriptions, the need for Civil Guard and militia patrols to keep order in the key cities of Lugo and Orense in October 1936 as regular troops were being sent to the front, indicate that the region did not surrender unconditionally to the new military command. Even the censored press of the time gives examples of unrest that undermine the myth propagated by the military authorities of the time of a pacified rebel rearguard.​[1]​

Whilst not a major battleground, the region was not a silent backwater in which all resistance to the Army had been crushed. Alongside extensive purges of the civil service, the local administration, courts martial, and summary executions, (a conservative figure of 3,000 political opponents were killed by the end of 1936) the continuing manhunt for dissenters and “rebels”, there is sufficient evidence to dismiss the myth of an all pervasive military authority in the region. Arguably there is an insight into the sense of crisis felt in certain echelons of the regional command, suggesting that in the period up to the end of 1936, before political unification and military successes on its borders, most notably in Asturias, there existed in Galicia a strong atmosphere of opposition and discontent towards the Franco-led regime. On 6 August the Portuguese Consul in La Coruña reported to Lisbon the second gun attack on the German consulate and the departure of German subjects aboard the battleship Koln.​[2]​ In September he wrote that at Ferrol “suspected anarchists” were being shot without trial, an incident singularly absent from the press.​[3]​

A few days after this incident, the commander of the 8th Division informed General Mola, the General of the Northern Campaign, of a fire at the CAMPSA fuel dump in the city.​[4]​ Officially, the fire started accidentally during the transfer of fuel from a tanker to the rail carriage, where one person was harmed.​[5]​

On 17 September, the Portuguese Consul, Manuel Sarraga Leal, gave the true version of events. The fire was started deliberately by Popular Front sympathisers trying to prevent the fuel reaching its final destination, Ferrol, for use on the cruiser Canarias, provoking a mass exodus of the city.​[6]​ Radio broadcasts from Barcelona on the night of 15 September proclaimed that La Coruña was once again in the hands of the Popular Front.​[7]​

The above incidents illustrate a certain level of organization among the individuals opposed to the rebel regime. The reports of huído activity, the collections organized in the capitals and in the provinces also bear testimony to such a hypothesis. Whilst any perceived threat posed by such groups may have been greater than their actual ability to act decisively, the evidence available suggests that any threat was enough to provoke the military authorities in the region into ruthless action. 

Perhaps the most organized attempt at a counter-insurrection took place in La Coruña on 22 October 1936, at the headquarters of the VIII 8th Division, involving links between the other provincial capitals and the support of reinforcements from Barcelona. The first reference to this came in an extraordinary report filed by the Portuguese Consul at Coruña, which described the discovery of a revolt being planned among men of the 8th Infantry Regiment. This resulted in the execution of eight men and the rearmament of the civilian militias which had been increasingly restricted in their access to arms.​[8]​

The eight men executed, all conscripts, were caught only after another conscript from Buño in Malpica revealed the plans for the uprising. Tried and executed on the same day, in front of 2,000 men who were then immediately sent to the front. The rumours of the executions that circulated among the population had an extremely demoralizing effect on the anti-insurgencymilitary sectors of society, more so than any propaganda.​[9]​

One of the immediate consequences of this suppressed counter rebellion was the court martial held on 14 November against the civilian Eloy Lemus Suárez and fourteen others, two of whom were linked to a previous attempted uprising in October. During the interrogations, the military authorities were alerted to another imminent counter uprising within their own divisional headquarters.​[10]​ The men involved were interrogated in separate locations, some in Vigo.​[11]​ The trial, begun on 10 November, was concluded four days later. The investigation conducted by Civil Guard Lt. José González Rodríguez reveals a high level of unrest within the ranks of the military regime itself, made up as it was largely of conscript troops still loyal to their trade unionist or syndicalist past. González concluded that four of those suspected of involvement in the plot had been shot for trying to escape, that is paseado.​[12]​ The prosecutor, Hermán Puertas Barbedillo, gave further insights into the level of preparation behind this particular rebellion, which had as its final goal the armament of the civilian population to fight the insurgent forces and to which three hundred civilians were committed.​[13]​

The authenticity of this uprising was confirmed by one of the individuals accused, who added that within the Supply Corps barracks the men were aware of similar plots to rebellion in the infantry and artillery regiments, including the second Coastal Artillery Regiment.​[14]​ The court martial, presided over by Lt. Colonel José Durán Salgado, reached its verdict on 15 November, sentencing five to death and seven to life imprisonment, and absolving another three. The condemned men were executed shortly afterwards on 23 November.​[15]​ The only public reference in the local press to the above was the court martial of Mariano Bodelón Rodríguez, one of the ringleaders of the coup.​[16]​

Beneath the veneer of superficial conviviality portrayed by the military authorities, rank and file unrest was widespread. Apart from the two known attempted rebellions mentioned above, other conspiratorial groups in La Coruña met in the Sta. Maragarita or the Sta. Lucía districts to discuss similar plans. The recruitment of conscript troops from around the region made Coruña, Ferrol and Vigo a focus for those dissatisfied with the insurgent regime. At Ferrol, the dockyard, despite militarization and the attempts of the Falange syndicates to support the rebellion, was also an important centre of discontent given the high numbers of anarchist Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT) members in the area prior to the war. 

It has been assumed, especially by some Galician nationalist writers, that the repression at Ferrol was motivated by the unprovoked and unnecessary slaughter of men and women who had supported either the Republican government, the autonomy statute, or both. The physical removal of opponents to the new military regime was arguably also due to the insecurity of the new regime. Ferrol witnessed two important attempted mutinies, which, combined with the attempted uprisings at Coruña, reinforced the military's conception that tough measures were required to keep the local population in check. After speeding up the development of the cruiser Baleares in the wake of the insurrection, the pressure to recruit enough personnel to bring her into service meant that the naval authorities were taking a calculated risk, given the resentment in the city. This policy very nearly backfired on the military authorities on 17 December 1936. Again, another coordinated rebellion took place resulting in seventy crew members being summarily executed. If the naval command believed such exemplary killings would pacify the area, they were proved wrong when ten days later when another attempted mutiny took place on board of the destroyer España. That time, forty men were summarily executed as a result.​[17]​

The nature of the repression in Galicia has been subject to recent debate; some believe that the military were largely unaware of what was being conducted in their name, and the majority of the repression was indiscriminate, carried out by the civilian militias and cacique-controlled civil guards. Others have used the term paralegal to discern between the official, military authority repression and that tacitly carried out in their name masking the more personal motivations behind it.​[18]​ From the evidence available, most of the repression was justified and carried out by the new military authorities, struggling, as they saw it, to keep the region under control. Indiscretions, acts of personal vengeance, were tolerated, but not encouraged.

Whatever the internal state of the VIII Division, the demands of the war elsewhere effectively meant that the problems within the rearguard were of secondary importance. On 12 November the Division received orders from Franco to send 600 men to eleven provincial capitals with an additional 1,200 men to both Zaragoza and Sevilla. The order added, “Also send 1,000 men to Talavera and 600 to Tabores to make up for the losses there, volunteers preferably, if not, conscripts.” Yet by March 1937, the local military commanders had requested that troops be sent back to pacify the rearguard, and to reinforce the Civil Guard in anti-huido activities.​[19]​

This taking for granted of the stability and security of the Galician rearguard is something that has continued over time. Ultimately insurgent control of the “Nationalist larder” as Galicia became known in rebel propaganda, was guaranteed, but not without considerable effort on the part of the military authorities, only nominally in control in 1936. Whilst numbers of regular troops in the region may have diminished in November, other measures were taken to guarantee the security of the rearguard. On 30 December 1936, a member of the secret police, the Bureau of Investigation and Vigilance (Cuerpo de Investigación y Vigilancia) reported to General Mola about Galicia, in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the Northern Campaign:
 The situation at the moment requires us to urgently increase our services in the cities of Coruña, Vigo, El Ferrol and other cities, where such surveillance is necessary to ensure the security of the State and the requirements of the war.​[20]​
	
The need for such a force was underlined by a report from the Jefatura Superior de Policía on the background of certain members of the ordinary police force still in service. The investigation of these and other individuals had already progressed considerably and needed greater expansion given the pressures of looking into the political of so many individuals – , 14,000 in Galicia alone. Recommendations were made that two leading policemen should be removed because of their outwardly pro-Popular Front stance. ​[21]​

The Head of Police believed more could be done to ensure the security of the rearguard from within. The request to increase the number of secret agents operating in the three largest cities in the region is illustrative of the instability of the rebel military command in the region which could trust neither its largely conscript force nor the civilian militias. 
	
As 1936 came to a close, unrest within the rearguard increased. Any initial enthusiasm for the movement had quickly waned among the majority of civilian society. The situation prevalent in the region was succinctly summed up by the British Consul, William Oxley, in his final report of the year. He described a region full of dissatisfaction where, “it would not require a great deal for a sudden violent reaction to set in with attendant serious disorder.” The attempted revolts in Coruña, Ferrol and attacks on Vigo from huido groups had culminated in several hundred executions between them. The repression and continuation of the war meant disillusionment in with the regime was spreading to even the sectors of society who once most enthusiastically supported the uprising.​[22]​

Some of the 14,000 names formed the basis of the huido movement which, as the war dragged on, became the most obvious manifestation of opposition to the rebel regime in the region.

2. The Organization of the Huidos: The Neira Group
The next section of the paper essay will focus on just one of the approximately 23 huido groups which existed in Galicia, with varying degrees of activity, during the war and post war years. It will look into the origins of the Neira group, which operated around the Ferrol/Ortigueira area as far north as Vivero in Lugo, one of the four main areas of operation for these groups.​[23]​ The guerrilla movement did not suddenly appear in Galicia after April 1939, but was the culmination of the various individuals who had escaped arrest in 1936 and subsequent years, and by that stage were physically and mentally prepared to continue (Heine 1982: 14).​[24]​ The Neira group (Los de Neira), were led by José Neira Fernández, originally from Ortigueira, who had dodged his military draft in the spring of 1938. The group had their origins in the huidos who had originally taken to the mountains and hills to hide from the military authorities because of their political sympathies, to avoid conscription, or both, and wait for the conflict to end. As the war continued, they actively participated in the struggle against the regime, with whatever was at their disposal. For these men, the Civil War period is described by those ex-guerrillas that lived through it as the escapado phase, when many attacks had less to do with ideology or a cause but more to do with money and survival. This phase did, however, witness an increased organizational sophistication on the part of those involved which lasted until the end of 1941. José Neira was a key figure in that initial restructuring, becoming the de facto provincial huido coordinator, organizing increased patrols around the area of Ortigueira, El Ferrol and Puentes de García Rodríguez. This group, of approximately 15 men in 1940, expanding to 50 by 1943, extended their operations to Puentedeume, and eventually the coastal area of Cée, Vimianzo and El Pindo (Heine, 1982: 62). The majority of the men were from Ferrol where some had served as carabineros in Muros and Noya. The rest of the group were comprised of labourers or fishermen from Viveiro and two, at least, were Catalan sailors that had escaped after the resistance on the battleship Admiral Cervera. Also part of the group was the teacher Marecelino Rodríguez Fernández, O Marrofer, who would later assume control of the group as part of the IV Guerrilla Group (IVa Agrupación Guerrillera). ​[25]​

This group also maintained contacts with other pockets of resistance organised in Lugo under the nominal command of Luís Trigo Chao, O Gardarríos, which whose group killed José Viador Trasiera, the provincial leader of the Falange, in June 1940, José Viador Trasiera as well asand another Falangist prominent in the repression around the area of Foz in the first months of the war (Heine, 1982: 64). 

A great deal of mystique has been accorded to the guerrilla groups, making them out to be modern day Robin Hoods, attacking only those that merited such action, and not putting undue pressure on the civilian population to sustain them. Other than the attacks mentioned above, the Neira group’s activities were frequently limited due to the paucity of materials and men available at their disposal, and tended to be focused on well-known figures from the regime and their collaborators. Yet, compared to other groups in the region, they were slightly more proactive and not just restricted to actions concerned mainly with self-defence as the above Falangist attacks testify. Other Falangists and clerics were also targeted by the group during the 1939-1942 period. This slightly more aggressive policy was a reaction to the increased repression conducted in the Ferrol/Cedeira area by the local Civil Guard forces under Lieutenant Torres and Corporal Díaz in May 1939. According to Manuel Pillado, Neira decided that, in order to survive, he and the group would have to instigate attacks rather than wait to be caught and killed. The first action of this new strategy was the attack on the priest at Senra in the summer of 1939.​[26]​

Such action was possible due to the level of organization attained in the Ferrol-Viveiro area, with contacts and homes for refuge and support made available by sympathisers. They did not, could not, spend all of their time hiding in the hills, especially in winter. During this time, Neira liased with locals and ensured the men stayed with the hijas de solteras, single daughters of sympathisers, pretending to be their husbands. This often became a semi-permanent arrangement, which had the added advantage of providing more safe houses in which to hold meetings and plan attacks. Bank and business hold-ups became an important source of income, conducted by well-dressed and well-groomed attackers, smartly sent off by their surrogate wives, not arousing suspicion from bank employees or the Civil Guard.

A significant number of these supporters’ hideouts were maintained by workers in the Ferrol dockyard (as well as other towns along the coast), and rural areas, including a significant number of professionals, especially doctors and teachers. As the tide of war turned in Europe, this group of Republican sympathisers came to include disillusioned Falangists and Civil Guards. This tolerance by the Civil Guard, in particular, explains why only two guerrilleros were killed in the province up to 1945, and why the Neira group itself was able to operate as extensively as it did. After one of the group was captured following an attack in Redada, the Civil Guard in charge of the interrogation stopped the interview after some information had been given about activities in Ortigueira, in order not to further implicate other operations.​[27]​

Between 1939 to 1941 the Neira group and other guerrilla units in Galicia benefited from a tangible decline in civilian support for the ‘glorious national movement’. Certainly for Neira and his men, the period 1941-43 saw increased numbers and improved organizational abilities. A relatively adroit system of distribution of supplies and/or orders was developed by meetings in safe bars (Pinta in Mugardos in particular), packages left at cruceiros every other day, and halves of postcards to be presented to contacts with the other half to identify themselves as fellow guerrilla conspirators.​[28]​ Their organization was so efficient that one of the Neira group, Angel Franco, was able to spend 20 days in a private health clinic in Coruña in 1942 without being detected (Heine, 1982: 68).

This direct and tacit support was consolidated by the intelligent strategy, adopted by the Neira and other guerrilla groups in the north of Coruña, of not operating in areas where they were not well known by the population, to maximize their chance of success and limit the possibility of infiltration. They also adhered to the policy of only targeting well-known figures behind the regime and its sympathisers. Whilst well organized, they did suffer reversals such as the arrest of two of the group in Cedeira in March 1941 and the leader of the local cell shortly after, resulting in their subsequent executions at Ferrol in January 1942 (Heine, 1982: 69).

For the majority of these men, and probably Neira himself, being part of the vanguard of the anti-francoist struggle in Spain is not how they would have perceived themselves. Survival, combined with some satisfaction at the distress they were causing to the regime and its sympathisers was enough. But, with that greater level of experience and organization, combined with developments elsewhere in Europe, there began a very slow process of unifying the various disparate groups into a more coordinated force, with a stronger element of ideological coherence. The Neira group established ties with the emerging communist cell in the Construcciones Navales Militares S.A. (now Bazán) dockyard in Ferrol, who benefited from the arms provided by Amando Carro Pérez. It also provided inspiration for the workers in the dockyard to organize themselves politically, providing tangible proof of outside opposition to the regime: one of their most important roles and also the most difficult to quantify (González Vidal, 1999: 57). However, it was not until mid-1944 that something resembling the Federación guerrillera came into limited existence.

Neira could well be described as one of the guerrilla leaders who was opposed, or at least apathetic to, the greater ideological organization being witnessed among the disparate groups in Galicia in 1943, especially after the fall of Stalingrad. Indeed, the main instigator behind this increased politicization in northern Coruña/Lugo was not Neira, but Marcelino Dominguez, O Marrofer, the ex-teacher. It appears he was better able to get his views across more coherently, and it was he who gradually came to dominate the group and ally it more closely to the Spanish Communist Party, of which he was a member. He was perhaps helped in this process in that many of the most experienced members of the group, close to Neira, suffered a considerable setback in Ferrol in February 1943. Two of their number, Leonardo Gómez, O Trancas, and Antonio Molins, O Noy, were surprised by a Civil Guard patrol in at their safe house. Although both managed to escape, the principal coordinator for the area, Eugenio Bernal, was arrested several hours later, and shortly after that so were 21 other members of the Neira group. Some suspected O Marrofer himself of being involved, although the testimoniesy of survivors apportion blame squarely on the indiscretions of O Trancas. Neira himself, already eclipsed by O Marrofer as the group’s leader, was shot in the summer of 1944.​[29]​

At the unification meeting in 1943, O Marrofer had also proposed that the group take direct action to extend the war into Spain and involve the Allies, preceding the failed Arán Valley invasion of October 1944 in the Pyrenees by a year (Alvarez, 1991: 261-271). His suggestion to attack two barracks at Ortigueira and another between Viveiro and Ribadeo, to capture weapons, cut the railway communications between Ferrol and Oviedo and then to resist as long as possible until Allied intervention, was rejected by the surviving members of the Neira group, given their limited numbers and also the limited chance of success.​[30]​

With the retreat of the Axis forces, the guerrilla movement in the region also reached its zenith in terms of both support and confidence. In a series of rapid developments the remnants of the Neira group were by the end of 1944 integral components of the IV Agrupación, with O Marrofer as its founder. Under the auspices of the PCE this would develop into the Ejercito Guerrillero de Galicia. Yet it is important to stress that the guerrilla groups in the region, with the Neira group as a very good example, were not for the most part the products of political party organization, but rather they developed autonomously (Alvarez, 1991: 25 and Heine, 1982: 265). Their moment of greatest optimism – possible foreign intervention to remove Franco – was also the one tinged with greatest disappointment. As they restructured and reorganised themselves into the guerrilla federation, IV Coruña, III Lugo, II Orense, to better capitalize on the crisis within the supporters of the Franco regime, by the time they could be said to resemble an organized force, with better access to weapons and propaganda, their moment had passed. Despite official UN ostracisation, the declaration in April 1946 by Britain, France and the US that the restoration of democracy in Spain would be left to the Spaniards themselves, made even the most militant of members realize that it would be impossible to topple Franco from power. Gradually divisions started to develop between opposing groups, with those who wanted to carry on the armed struggle, as well as those too afraid to stop, and others who were demoralised and saw no other alternative thant to give up their resistance. Some of the group that who had integrated well into local village or town life, simply did not return to guerrilla activity and slipped back into normal everyday life. The increased repression on the part of the Movement and the disappearance of the cosy tolerance of the early 1940’s also contributed to the decision of many to leave the guerrilleros, further persuaded by the PCE decision in 1948 to abandon the armed struggle in order to concentrate on infiltration of labour groups and organizations (Alvarez, 1991: 25 and Heine, 1982: p.267) .
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